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The Ability of German Political Parties to resolve 
the given Problems: the Situation in 1982
Dr. Karl Hohmann
My talk today will not attempt to report on the stage now 
reached in academic discussion of the capacity of the 
parties in the German Bundestag to resolve conflicts, nor 
will it offer you the results of the latest opinion polls in 
the Federal Republic of Germany. I should add, before 
continuing, that the parties represented in the Bundestag are 
as follows: the Christian Democratic and Christian Social 
Union of Germany (the CDU/CSU); the Social Democratic Party 
of Germany (SPD); and the Free Democratic Party (F.D.P.). My 
wish is to inform you of my observations on this subject, 
both past and present, or - to be more precise - during 
recent years. In so doing, I can draw on experience gathered 
over a long period as a member of Ludwig Erhard's staff when 
he was Minister of Economics and later Federal Chancellor.
Not least among this experience is the knowledge gained in 
preparing for three Bundestag elections and numerous regional 
elections.
My talk will deal with the problems and conflicts of 
contemporary West German society; the worries of many people 
both here and elsewhere about the future (with many people in 
West Germany speaking openly of their anxiety) and the 
present situation of the parties and the government. Finally, 
I shall try to answer my own question as to whether, or to 




























































































important tasks. As the "Law on Political Parties" of 1967 
points out. this consists in introducing the political aims 
which they have enunciated into the process of policy 
formation . The complexity of the problem may be illustrated 
by reference to an incident which I heard of during a 
conference organized by the Walter Raymond Foundation.
Speaking at the 1979 German Tax Advisers Congress, the 
Federal Minister of Finance, Herr Matthofer, made the point 
that, given the political realities of today, the existing 
ownership of property and the existing privileges will hardly 
ever be subject to serious challenge. A year later in 1980, 
the Vice-President of the supreme German court (the Federal 
Constitutional Court), Professor Wolfgang Zeidler, had the 
following to say in a speech to the German Law Congress:
"One could almost believe that Hans Matthofer even surpassed 
Ulrike Meinhof (a former leading German terrorist) when he 
made that statement: in formulating this precise sentence, he 
succeeded in furnishing a convincing justification for 
terrorism in a manner which she never achieved despite all 
her efforts as a writer. If this remark by the Federal 
Finance Minister were really to describe an effectively 
constituent principle of our political system, one could not 
with conviction contradict efforts to use force as a means of 
political action. Wherever the opportunity to carry out 
reforms is lacking, then revolution becomes legitimate!"




























































































link between the smooth functioning of the democratic 
institutions and the absence of illegitimate force is clear 
for all to see. During the last 15 years, this link has 
proved its strength on many occasions in West Germany. If the 
Government or the Parliament prove incapable of accommodating the 
claims of organized groups against the State or its
intermediary agencies as part of the public interest, then that
constitutes a danger to social stability as a whole. It is
not only the will to carry out reforms but the very concrete
ability to translate them into reality - if necessary against
the wishes of minorities - which decides whether peace or
discord will prevail within a given society. The fact that
the political parties in themselves arrange for a balance
between their interests and that Members of Parliament from
one group reach an understanding with Members of Parliament
from another group is an everyday feature of all Western
democracies including West Germany. Indeed, it probably
promotes the functioning of their systems rather than impairs
them. Nevertheless, the question remains as to the limits to
such bargaining. After all, if Parliament and the parties
represented there see themselves merely as "closely linked
coalitions between the elite of the State, the major
companies and the employees' organizations - in other words
as a coalition of big government, big business and big unions
- that will spell the beginning of the end for a smoothly
functioning parliamentarianism. In that case, those holding
opposite views will have to look for fresh opportunities to
express themselves outside the democratic system. Perhaps




























































































experienced in Che Federal Republic of Germany in the
late Sixties and early Seventies.
But at the same time, it is noticeable in all German parties 
that the sensitivity to such distortions of the democratic 
process has increased. The SPD wants to be more and jjs more 
than the party of the trade unions. The CDU/CSU represents 
not only the middle class, the farming community and 
industry: it also embraces large numbers of employees,and 
manual workers in particular, among its voters. And the former 
middle-class party of the FDP is becoming a party which 
appears eligible for all social groups including wage 
earners. As the internal structure of the German parties 
undergoes necessary changes, so their claims to competency 
adapt accordingly and on an equal scale to the new 
circumstances. Each of the parties feels competent to handle 
every single issue and completely capable of resolving 
problems. But what continues to distinguish them apart from 
the given historic legacy (or perhaps one should call it 
"ballast") is their concept of the relationship between the 
citizen and the State, their economic philosophy, their 
assessment of the role of Christianity in politics and its 
role for citizens and society. These generate considerable 
friction in everyday political life, which frequently covers 
up the existing common interests.
All three parties of which we are speaking are people's parties 
in the sense that this is set out in their political 




























































































concurrence between the parties and their target groups in 
society does not reach the depth of the concrete political 
measures taken. Major and wide-ranging themes have become 
dominant - in addition to freedom, justice, peace und 
solidarity, it is the concepts which characterize the 
problematic areas of politics without pointing to any 
solutions. In the light of its commitment to a highly 
varied grass-roots basis which is now drifting apart, 
the Federal German Government finds it increasingly difficult 
to take decisions and to implement them. But the Opposition 
is also experiencing difficulty in formulating concrete 
policies. The more the parties have thrown ope'n their
ranks to all, the more problematic the process of substantive 
policy formation has become and the more often there arises 
the question as to their ability to govern.
Not that the parties are interchangeable. But in the struggle 
to gain votes, they offer themselves to everyone - often at 
the expense of their programmatic image. Nevertheless, these 
three parties (the CDU/CSU, SPD and F.D.P.) do not cover the 
whole range of voters' wishes. That applies not only to local 
problems in district and regional elections which are not 
represented by the big parties, but also to the elections for 
the Bundestag. The central topics in this context are ecology 
and nuclear power; and these themes are starting to alter the 
unchanging party scene, to restructure the stock of party 
members and loyal voters, and to challenge the party 
programme. The citizens of today want answers to the problems 




























































































the use of nuclear energy. Where the established parties fail 
to provide convincing answers, this increases the chance for 
new groupings such as the "Greens". But a lot of changes are 
taking place at present so that any account of the
distribution of forces can be nothing more than a kind of freeze-frame. 
One of the reasons for the transitory nature of many of these 
groupings is their association with other issues such as 
alliances with Marxists. By the same token, the limitation of 
their political statements to one or two themes is too devoid 
of substance for many citizens. But the big parties are being increa­
singly forced to deal with the subject of the
environment and of nuclear energy and to convince voters of 
their competence. This must be credited to the efforts 
undertaken by the "Greens", although at the same time it also 
threatens their political future as an independent force. The 
assumption that the ecological disputes will take on an 
peaceful character and that the violent clashes will become a 
thing of the past is a doubtful one. For some of the 
supporters of environmental protection and opponents of 
nuclear energy are more interested in the conflict per se. If 
those opposed to environmental pollution and the use of 
nuclear energy who are not represented by political parties 
were to start voicing their critical views via Parliament, 
that could help to render the dialogue more pertinent and 
objective. The ecological movement (as personified by the 
democratic Greens) would face a new objective. In wide 
sections of the population, distrust is growing of the 
extraparliamentary forms of oppositional action, since these 




























































































The capacity of the political parties to resolve the various 
problems will also have to be displayed in other fields, too, 
in future. One of these fields is that of the disputes 
resulting from the distribution of economic resources. In the 
past, the pace of economic growth over a period of many years 
led to a relatively high degree of social peace. Naturally, 
there have been strikes and lock-outs in West Germany, i.e. 
serious industrial disputes. Moreover, the overthrow of Willy 
Brandt as Federal Chancellor is not unjustifiably blamed in 
part on the exaggerated wage and salary demands submitted and 
enforced by the trade union with responsibility for the 
public services under the Social-Democratic trade union 
leader, Kluncker.
What form does the dispute assume when growth is modest or 
lacking? Can we still count on having representatives of the. 
two sides of industry whose views will continue to guarantee
social peace in West Germany? What would be the significance
from
in this context of a change a government under Schmidt to 
one under Kohl?
Let us begin with a change of government. As twenty years of 
CDU/CSU government from 1949 to 1969 under Chancellors 
Adenauer, Erhard and Kiesinger indicate, social peace will 
not be a priori endangered if Kohl becomes chancellor. I 
shall not go so far as to assume the opposite. Nevertheless, 
a change of government - and many speak in this context of a 




























































































political scene to an end. As regards the trade unions, my 
assumptions are as follows. If the German trade unions remain 
stable within themselves and retain the capacity to 
neutralize exaggerated trends and if they overcome the 
present lingering crisis surrounding certain of their leaders 
in connection with the events in a large trade-union owned 
company - and in my opinion this is likely - then we shall 
retain relatively strong trade unions in West Germany. As 
proof of their democratic legitimation, they will also 
co-operate with CDU/CSU governments and permit a Federal 
Chancellor Kohl to govern our country successfully even if 
growth rates remain modest and if there is no likelihood 
of growth in private income in some cases.
But there are other opinions which militate against my 
optimistic prognosis. Let me quote Wolfgang Roth, the SPD 
spokesman on economic policy. Speaking some time ago at a 
symposium organized by the Ludwig Erhard Foundation, he had 
the following to say in reply to his own question: what would 
happen if there were no growth? Roth said that "if social 
peace were to be guaranteed, then the policy of promoting 
equality would have to be much more radical then hitherto. 
There would not only have to be a more even distribution of 
accrued resources, but also a more direct approach to the 
question of what should belong to whom? Nobody can be 
expected to remain reasonable and keep quiet if he gets 
nothing from the additional growth,unless perhaps he gets 
something of what is already there." Roth turned his 




























































































asking which forms of organization they wish to use in 
resolving future disputes in the resolution of disputes. 
"Anyone who says airily that no more economic growth is 
necessary is also indirectly affirming that the social 
consensus and the social peace we have had during the
last 30 years are now ended."
If that opinion were correct, then the Federal Republic of 
Germany would now be standing on the threshold of a major
phase of her existence. The fact that this need not
a
necessarily be the case results from/clear-cut change in the 
conscious approach adopted by German society, a change in its 
set of values marked by the assignment of less importance to 
material things. Admittedly, this does not apply to the 
leadership of the organized groups such as the trade unions. 
In keeping with old traditions, they see the size of the 
annual wage increases as proof of their success. But is this 
also the case for the great mass of employees? Is not a 
reliable job in itself and the reduction of youth
unemployment of greater importance than the ritual of the 
yearly struggle for more wages? The ecological disputes and 
the struggle to develop nuclear energy blunt the impact of 
wage demands because they bind considerable energies which 
could otherwise have been released in industrial disputes. 
Furthermore, strikes are not popular in West Germany. Those 
policies of the political parties directed towards promoting 
understanding and domestic peace can expect to gain wide 
support. A further explanation lies in the relatively high 




























































































broad masses - something which even demagogues cannot deny.
The authority of the German parties as "organized groups of 
politically like-minded persons" exercising a strong 
influence upon the shaping of the State above all in the 
composition of the popular assembly, the formation of the 
government, the choice of the Head of State and the 
acitivities of the public-law organizations - all of which 
are referred to in the Law on Political Parties of 1967 - 
this authority of the parties has suffered and been forced to 
accept losses. This took place (and is still taking place) in
a sphere which falls under the very general heading of a
"peace movement". When several hundred thousand mostly young 
persons gathered in Bonn last October for a so-called peace 
demonstration, they had a police permit for doing so: yet the 
Government and the parliamentary parties were in reality 
against this rally. Only outsiders of the political parties, 
above all from the ranks of the government coalition, put in 
an appearance. The established powers of the State looked on
with a feeling of helplessness as a huge number of young
persons gathered peacefully and apparently spontaneously 
(though in reality this was probably organized) alongside 
them or even against them in order to demonstrate for 
"peace". Although the expression "peace policy" appears in 
the political programme of each of the German parties, the 
latter had apparently not succeeded in convincing large 
sections of the young population that peace was safe in their 
hands. It must certainly be impossible for anyone to 




























































































anything other than a peace policy since their establishment. 
However, they have not succeeded in making this generally 
comprehensible and representing it in a convincing manner.
The explanation probably lies in the fact that many people do 
not understand the position of the NATO states on questions 
of military equilibrium, the arms build-up with missiles and 
their stationing in Central Europe. Moreover, the Soviets 
have succeeded in drawing a veil over their internal and 
external policy of using force. A third point is the support 
now given to radicals in the light of the arms-race in East 
and West, because the parties have apparently lost contact 
with members of the young generation on these questions - a 
situation which has seldom or never occurred in West
Germany.
A related problem lies in the increasing number of young 
Germans who refuse to perform military service for 
conscientious reasons. The right to refuse, on grounds of 
conscience, to render war service involving the use of arras 
is set out in Article 12a of our Constitution, although this 
then leads to an obligation to render a substitute service.
In 1980, the number of applications by conscientious 
objectors amounted to approximately 54,000 and in 1981 to 
approximately 58,000. Not only the number of conscientious 
objectors is alarming at the present time but also - and this 
is even more serious - the fact that certain final-year 
grammar school boys avail themselves of this opportunity to 
the extent of 80 and 90 %. Quite a few people ask themselves 




























































































producing for the future of German society and, moreover, 
what motivation lies behind it. Is it really conscience? Or 
simple convenience? The German parties subscribe without 
exception to the right embodied in the Basic Constitutional 
Law to refuse military service for reasons of conscience. But 
they also see the dangers if an exceptional provision becomes 
the rule. The question of whether or not we can expect any 
changes seems to be a problem for the longer term. But 
perhaps this tr-end will change as certain fashions do.





Is there such a thing as a typical pattern of policy among 
the three political parties? In the case of unemployment, the 
answer is a clear "yes". The historic legacy of the economic 
philosophy peculiar to each party to which I have already 
referred is very noticeable in this field. As regards the 
second case - inflation - the answer must remain speculative. 
In the third instance - public finance - there exist 
clear-cut phalanxes of forces and they offer opposite 
solutions. These phalanxes are the old fronts which are once 
more taking shape. There is the contrast between those in 
favour of collective solutions (usually in the form of a 
state-run economy) on the one hand, and those who advocate a 





























































































To an observer who has gathered his experience outside 
Germany, this controversy may seem virtually
incomprehensible. Nevertheless, it has historic roots in this 
country. After World War II when the problem was one of 
reconstructing a demolished Germany, the supporters of the 
two systems of political and economic management faced each 
other as implacable opponents. In the end, the advocates of 
the market-economy system gained the upper hand. In the first 
elections to the German Bundestag in 1949, the parties in 
favour of the Social Market Economy gained a victory. This 
decision not only concerned a question of economic policy, it 
also affected nearly all spheres of life in the State and in 
society. That was bound to be so, since there exists an 
indissoluble inter-relationship between the economic system 
and the overall state and social system. Walter Eucken spoke 
of the "interdependence of the systems" comprising the State, 
society and the economy. Dictatorship and a market economy 
cannot exist simultaneously in a State. Market-economy 
freedom and political freedom go hand in hand just as 
dictatorship and a regimented economy do.
A historic review of the first two decades in West Germany 
after World War II reveals the unique solutions applied to 
the problems of reconstruction. The methods adopted, 
corresponding as they did to the principles of a free market 
economy, engendered surprise and general admiration. The 




























































































among a broad section of the population as an economic 
system. This was transferred to the parties which represented 
these people, whilst the opponents of the system fell more 
and more in the esteem of public opinion. As a result, the 
Social Democrats finally came round to embracing the new line 
of approach when they adopted their Godesberg Programme of 
1959.
The State where all this took place, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, differed from the minimal State proposed by the 
early Liberals in that it acquired the character of a strong 
State, and saw itself not only as the guarantor of the 
general conditions for a free political and economic society 
but also simultaneously enabled people to achieve a fresh 
self-awareness. Without this strong State emerging in line 
with the Basic Constitutional Law of 1949, the attempt in
West Germany to build up a free society with a socially committed
market economy on the shambles left behind by the
war would probably have been doomed to failure. For a long period
of time, it proved more attractive to most citizens than the 
concepts offered by the Socialists or Social Democrats. The 
parliamentary majority in favour of this policy determined 
the fate of the country for twenty years. The middle-class 
parties were believed more capable of coping with the largely 
economic problems confronting West Germany. This situation 
changed when other political problems began to dominate the 
scene - Ostpolitik, certain negative aspects of the economic 



























































































At the same time, new developments began to emerge in regard 
to the central economic issues of unemployment, inflation and 
public finance. In view of the behaviour of the political 
parties when faced by the problems of the labour market, 
Holger Bonus of the University of Konstanz recently made the 
following apt remark: What we find today is ideological 
trench warfare conducted with extreme grimness; discussions 
are a thing of the past; in the intolerance and recklessness, 
one thrashes one another with chains of arguments as if they 
were bicycle chains.
What is the origin of this phenomenon? Well, in the first 
place, the problems of the labour market are highly complex 
and explosive today. This is recognized nearly everywhere. A 
further complication in the case of West Germany is that the 
problems on the labour market have appeared with considerable 
abruptness. Thirdly, these problems have not only remained 
politically unresolved since about the year 1971, they have 
even grown worse almost continuously.
However, any assessment of the parties' capacity to resolve 
problems in this sphere must also include the following 
point. The parties in West Germany still clearly differ to a 
very great degree in their fundamental political approach.
The image of "people's parties" probably emerged for them in 
the 1950s much more because of the policy of that age than 
through any efforts of their own or through changes in the 
party programmes. Naturally, this circumstance becomes 




























































































express a view on really important matters. Since the social 
policy pursued under the Social Market Economy no longer 
exercises any integrative effect and since economic policy 
has returned to being a purely technocratic policy and is 
thus no longer directed as a fundamental principle towards 
realizing a generally accepted set of values - values with which 
all groups can identify, irrespective of their party - the 
old ideological positions on decisive questions are 
continuously breaking down. The question of whether the 
parties bear political responsibility or whether they form 
the Government or the Opposition is of secondary importance.
One of the big parties, the SPD, is still dominated by the 
experience gathered in the world of consumer demand: its 
central issues are just treatment, the redistribution of 
resources and the protection of the weaker members of 
society. The other party, the CDU/CSU, attaches greater 
weight to other experiences: personal achievement, 
consideration for others, social responsibility and due 
reward for the successful. The recommendations for practical 
economic policy which flow from such a differing approach 
could hardly be more dissimilar and contrary. One philosophy 
calls for relief for the business community, tax cuts, and 
balanced public budgets through economy measures: the other 
recommends additional state expenditure, economic programmes 
and subsidies for certain investments.
Similar differences and disputes are discernible in the 




























































































put into proper perspective in West Germany. At the present 
time, the shortcomings as regards other overall economic goals
industrial growth, a high level of employment, and the 
achievement of balance in foreign trade and payments - weigh 
more heavily than the inflation rate, which is relatively 
moderate by international comparison.
However, the level of national debt is a more serious 
problem. Although West Germany lies in mid position in the 
table of comparable countries, the problem of national debt 
aggravates politicial discussion and the reputation of the 
government. This issue together with the threat of 
unemployment could form the external cause for a rupture in 
the present governing coalition between the SPD and the 
F.D.P. in Bonn, because apparently a majority of voters 
assume that the CDU/CSU possess greater competence at properly 
regulating public finance over the medium and long
term. We shall have to wait for several years to prove the 
correctness of this assumption.
One feature common to all the German parties under discussion 
is their lack of courage in taking unpopular measures.i.e. 
doing whatever is necessary even if it does not win any 
general acclaim. This may be seen very clearly from a number 
of problems currently making the headlines in Germany after 
assuming scandalous proportions. They include a cut in public 
subsidies because these could only be financed on the same 
scale as hitherto by expanding the national debt. In other 





























































































by nutting into debt coming generations,who in turn will
Che debts we are incurring now. One necessary change would be 
to amend the laws governing services - including social 
security, in these fields, there is approximate agreement 
between the F.D.P. (or major segments of it) and the CDU/CSU, 
i.e. between the Opposition and one of the two government 
parties which may form tomorrow's government.
The current scene in West Germany is marked by a wide measure 
of political disaffection,whose real orig ns lie, in my 
opinion, in the voters' weariness with partv promises. The 
impression prevails that the parties are finding it difficult 
or impossible to cope with the problems confronting the 
Federal Republic of Germany as a State and also confronting 
modern German society. Whatever the issue at hand - the 
necessary cuts in the ballooning welfare institutions, a 
reduction in unemployment, balancing public finance, 
expanding on the requisite scale the use of nuclear energy or 
integrating the peace movement - everywhere one comes up against 
barriers which appear to obstruct the future. Sometimes, one 
gains the impression of self-paralysis. I would like to 
stress the point that my account is greatly influenced by the 
impressions of the current time. Yet, tomorrow, the situation 
may seem quite different. Why? Because Germans have learnt 
from their most recent history how to cope with more 
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